Does the environment have a causal effect on economic development? Using meteorological data, we reconstruct every country's exposure to the universe of tropical cyclones during . We exploit random within-country year-to-year variation in cyclone strikes to identify the causal effect of environmental disasters on long-run growth. We compare each country's growth rate to itself in the years immediately before and after exposure, accounting for the distribution of cyclones in preceding years. The data reject hypotheses that disasters stimulate growth or that short-run losses disappear following migrations or transfers of wealth. Instead, we find robust evidence that national incomes decline, relative to their pre-disaster trend, and do not recover within twenty years. Both rich and poor countries exhibit this response, with losses magnified in countries with less historical cyclone experience. Income losses arise from a small but persistent suppression of annual growth rates spread across the fifteen years following disaster, generating large and significant cumulative effects: a 90th percentile event reduces per capita incomes by 7.4% two decades later, effectively undoing 3.7 years of average development. The gradual nature of these losses render them inconspicuous to a casual observer, however simulations indicate that they have dramatic influence over the long-run development of countries that are endowed with regular or continuous exposure to disaster. Linking these results to projections of future cyclone activity, we estimate that under conservative discounting assumptions the present discounted cost of "business as usual" climate change is roughly $9.7 trillion larger than previously thought.
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January 30 scaled to the size estimate in (1) and the intensity measures from IBTrACS; and (3) the speed that the storm is translating over the surface. Using these reconstructed estimates for the wind field at each moment in time, LICRICE then integrates the exposure that pixels on the surface would have experienced during the life of the storm (see Figure 3 for an example).
We reconstruct wind exposure indices at each 0.1 To provide a useful point-wise summary statistic of this new data, we average pixel-level exposure across all 59 years of data for each pixel. This recovers the expected experience at each pixel, which we term the "cyclone-climate" of that pixel and display in Figure 5 . Cyclone exposure is not uniformly distributed around the planet, but instead it is concentrated in coastal countries in the tropics and middle latitudes. Countries very near the equator, such as Singapore, are not exposed to cyclones because the storms curve away from the equator as they conserve angular moment. Also, countries on the eastern coast of continents (eg. Madagascar) are generally more exposed than countries on western coasts (eg. Nigeria) because tropical cyclones are driven towards land by the westward blowing winds that dominate atmospheric circulations over regions where these storms form.
In principle, it is possible to develop numerous measures of wind exposure. Here we utilize two wind indices, based on climate physics, that summarize cumulative cyclone wind exposure in different ways. Each index has its own strengths and weaknesses.
